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MARITAL DEDUCTION PITFALLS - METHODS OF LOSING
THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
William A. Edwards
Of the three learned professions, the lawyer should be most aware of
the axiom that the chains he forges in life are the ones that bind his
clients in death. This is especially true for the attorney who would ven-
ture into the area of the marital deduction. This article will not discuss
the use of the marital deduction, but rather its misuse, %.e., marital deduc-
tion pitfalls under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. Further, the discus-
sion in this article will be limited to marital deduction pitfalls and draft-
ing problems in the following areas: (1) terminable interests; (2) tax
clauses; and (3) certain administrative provisions.
TERMINABLE INTERESTS
The greatest pitfall and most prolific cause of marital deduction liti-
gation is the so-called "terminable interest." In defining terminable in-
terest, the code and Treasury Regulations state that no marital deduction
is allowed with respect to property interests which will terminate on the
lapse of time, or on the occurrence or failure to occur of some contin-
gency.' The code makes three exceptions to the nondeductible terminable
interest rule. These exceptions, when not used with care, may prove to
be formidable obstacles to attorneys who would have their clients reap the
tax harvest of the marital deduction. These exceptions may be designated
as: (1) the survivorshlp exception, (2) the life estate power of ap-
pointment exception,3 and (3) the insurance exception.'
Survworship Exception
The survivorship exception to the terminable interest rule provides
that the interest passing to a surviving spouse will not be a nondeductible
interest because it is conditioned upon her surviving the decedent by not
more than six months, or dying as a result of a common disaster which
results in the death of the decedent, or both, provided that, as a matter of
fact, the surviving spouse does not die within the prescribed period or as
a result of a common disaster.5  The problem in this exception to the
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1) [hereinafter ared:as-CODE f].
2. CODE 5 2056(b) (3).
3. CODE 52056(b) (5).
4. CODE 9 2056(b) (6).
5. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-3 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reg. f].
WE.TERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
terminable interest rule is most often created by the legal draftsman who
strays from the language set forth in the code and regulations in desig-
nating the limited period of survival. Usually, the draftsman decides
to substitute his own ingenuity for the language of the code and
regulations. Such survivorship conditions as "to my wife if living at
the tme of the distribution of my estate,' '6 or "to my spouse if she sur-
vives the administration of my estate"' have often led to unwanted fed-
eral estate tax results. In the recent case of Bookwalter v Lamar,' the
decedent left everything to his wife provided she survived the administra-
tion of his estate. Clearly, the completion of the administration of an
estate can take more than six months, as viewed at the moment of the
testator's death. It is well established that unless the widow's indefeasible
interest vests at the moment of the testator's death, the marital deduction
is not available. The district court found the will to be ambiguous and
stated that local law favors early vesting thereby making the marital de-
duction available. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, also
applying local law, held that the conditional disposition created a termin-
able interest within the meaning of the 1954 Code, thereby defeating the
right to the marital deduction. The court was probably influenced by
the earlier decision of United States v Mappes9 in which the fatal clause
was: "in the event that my wife should die before my estate has been
administered. " The Tenth Circuit held in the Mappes case that un-
der state law the marital deduction was lost. Thus, the important point
to remember is that courts are not concerned with what actually happens,
but what could happen!
The survivorship exception to the terminable interest rule also has
certain ramifications where insurance is involved. If the payment of in-
surance proceeds to the surviving spouse is conditioned upon her being
alive upon receipt by the insurer of proof of the insured's death, the set-
tlement arrangement with respect to such insurance proceeds will not
qualify for the marital deduction. In this situation, the survivorstup ex-
ception to the terminable interest rule is not applicable because submis-
sion of due proof of the insured's death may or may not occur within the
six month period or thereafter."0 Thus, with respect to survivorship
clauses, whether in wills, trusts, or insurance contracts, the attorney should
religiously follow the requirements of section 2056(b) (3) of the code,
namely, that the limited survival period must not exceed six months.
6. Kasper v. Kellar, 217 F.2d 744, 746 (8th Cir. 1954); Farrell v. United States, 198 F.
Supp. 461 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Steele v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 316 (D. Mont. 1956).
7 United States v. Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963).
8. 323 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. dented, 376 U.S. 969 (1964)
9. United States v. Mappes, 318 F.2d 508 (10th Cir. 1963).
10. Rev. Rul. 54-121, 1954-1 CUM. BuLL. 196, 197
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Life Estate Power of Appointment Exception
The second exception to the terminable interest rule is the life estate
with a power of appointment in the surviving spouse which is exercisable
by her alone and in all events." Trouble usually arises in this area when
the draftsman attempts to add or detract from the conditions set forth in
the code and regulations, or from the application of state law on the
standard set in the will or trust for invasion of principal."2 Typical situ-
atons are where the testator leaves his entire estate in trust for his spouse
for life, remainder to others, with an unlimited power in the spouse to
use the principal of the trust for her comfort, health, and happiness; 3
or where the testator gives his spouse a legal life estate in land to sell as
she deems it to be in her best interest."4 Taxpayers have daimed that the
wife's life estate, coupled with a power to consume, qualified the estate
for the marital deduction. On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice claims that such interests are terminable, and do not qualify for the
marital deduction because what the spouse fails to consume during her
life passes on her death to the remaindermen. The most perplexing cases
occur where the power of invasion in the surviving spouse is so broad
that it appears to be an unlimited power to invade which, of course, would
qualify for the marital deduction. But, these cases have failed to qualify
for several reasons. Some courts have said that the surviving spouse had
no power to deal with property remaining at her death," while other
courts have held that application of local law cuts back the spouse's ap-
parently "unlimited power" by imposing a standard for consuming the
property which thereby creates a terminable interest' 6
In Estate of Tar'er v. Commissioner,' the decedents spouse was
given the right to receive portions of the principal as and when she may
demand for her use and/or the use or benefit of her children as she
deems advisable. This certainly would appear to be an unlimited power
of invasion. However, the court held that under applicable state law
the surviving spouse was not given an unlimited right to invade the
corpus; thus, the trust did not qualify for the marital deduction. Again
in Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner," the court considered a situation
11. CODE 5 2056(b) (5).
12. Reg. 5 20.2056(b)-5 (1958).
13. United States v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 297 F.2d 891 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 887 (1962); Estate of Tarver v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1958);
Piatt v. Gray, 201 F. Supp. 401 (W.D. Ky. 1961), af-Id, 321 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1963).
14. Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814
(1957); Geyer v. Bookwalter, 193 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
15. Estate of Ralph G. bMy, 32 T.C. 386 (1959), afi'd, 283 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1960).
16. See note 14 supra.
17. 255 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1958).
18. 241 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957)
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where a legal life interest was given to the decedent's wife with an un-
limited power to consume principal. The court held that a power to
consume was not an unlimited power to invade because the surviving
spouse had no power to deal with any unconsumed property. The court
pointed out that the wife could not appoint the principal to herself or to
her estate because as long as any of the principal of the estate remained,
it was to pass to the named remainderman.
In Estate of Field,9 which was decided under Ohio law, the decedent
left his residuary estate in trust for his surviving spouse with all of the
net income payable to her for life and with a power to consume the en-
tire estate for any purposes. Remaindermen were named to take any un-
consumed property The executor asked the local probate court for a
construction of the will; the court held that the surviving spouse had an
unrestricted power to dispose of the property which was exercisable by
her alone and in all events. However, the Tax Court held that because
of elaborate dispositive provisions relating to property that was not con-
sumed by the surviving spouse, a general power of appointment was not
created and the surviving spouse's interest was a terminable one.
The only ray of hope for the taxpayer seems to be embodied in about
three or four cases. For example, in Hoffman v McGinnts,2 ° decided in
1960, the decedent created a testamentary trust which provided that his
surviving spouse be given income for her life and "the right to use and
spend any or all of the principal of my said estate as she so desires", then
the draftsman provided a new wrinkle and said that the trust was to termi-
nate "as to that part of the principal so paid to her." The court held that
the language of the will gave the surviving spouse a power to appoint
principal to herself and free of trust, a power which was exercisable in
all events. Thus, it can be easily seen that the draftsman who uses the
power of invasion as a method to qualify an interest passing to a surviving
spouse for the marital deduction is, to say the least, skating on thin ice.
To avoid this terminable interest pitfall, the attorney has an uncom-
plicated answer" create a trust for the spouse to pay her all of the net in-
come with a discretionary power over principal in the trustee and a gen-
eral testamentary power in the surviving spouse to appoint by will any
principal that remains to anyone, including her estate, her creditors, and
the creditors of her estate with remainder over in default of the exercise
of her general testamentary power of appointment. By this change in
form, the substance of the testator's wishes can be achieved without sacri-
ficing the marital deduction.
19. 40 T.C. 802 (1963)
20. 227 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1960)
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Insurance Exception
The third exception to the nondeductible terminable interest rule-is
the life insurance and annuity exception.2' This exception covers the sit-
uation where the proceeds of a life insurance or annuity contract are held
by the insurer under an agreement by which the surviving spouse is to
receive the proceeds in installments, or interest on the proceeds, during
her life, and has power to appoint any balance remaining at her death to
herself or her estate or withdraw proceeds during her lifetime. This ex-
ception gives rise tw problems when limitations are placed by the policy
upon the surviving spouse's powers to withdraw, or appoint amounts left
with the insurers. The Treasury Regulations provide that formal limita-
tions upon the surviving spouse to appoint insurance proceeds to herself
or her estate will not prevent the power from being exercisable by the
surviving spouse in all events.22 However, in Estate of Werbe v. United
States,23 the insurance proceeds were left with the insurer who agreed to
pay the surviving spouse the interest on the proceeds for life. In addi-
tion, the surviving spouse was given a power to withdraw the amount left
with the insurer either in whole or in part, but the insurer placed certain
limitations on the manner and time of such withdrawals. In one policy,
withdrawals could be made only on interest due dates; no withdrawal less
than $100 was permitted, and compliance with the withdrawal request
could be deferred for six months after receipt of the request. The court
held that the restrictions placed upon the surviving spouse's power to
withdraw insurance proceeds went beyond mere formalities for the exer-
cise of the surviving spouse's power, and prevented it from being exer-
cisable in all events; thus, such an arrangement was held to be a termi-
nable interest. However, under a similar fact situation in the Werbe case,
the Tax Court held that this type of settlement arrangement for insurance
proceeds did qualify for the marital deduction, for the limitations placed
upon the manner of withdrawal by the spouse were strictly for the admin-
istrative convenience of the insurer.24 The problem of qualifying insur-
ance proceeds for the marital deduction should present no great problem
to the attorney. He can and should analyze the policies, giving special
attention to pre-1948 policies, to determine those which qualify for the
marital deduction using as a guide line the appropriate Treasury Regu-
lations.
Joint and Mutual Wills
Joint and mutual wills are not uncommon in several midwestern
states. The typical situation is for the husband and wife to execute a
21. CODE § 2056(b) (6).
22. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-6 (1958).
23. 273 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1959).
24. Estate of John J. Cornwell, 37 T.C. 688, 694 (1962).
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joint will or mutual wills leaving their entire estates to the survivor and
the estate of the survivor to the children. Such wills are held to be con-
tractual in nature, binding the survivor to leave his estate to the children.
The questions presented under such an arrangement are usually twofold,
namely- (1) whether assets passing under the will of the spouse first to
die qualify for the marital deduction;25 and (2) whether assets passing
outside the will qualify for the marital deduction." Differences in state
law have led to seemingly conflicting decisions concermng the availability
of the marital deduction where husband and wife have entered into joint
and mutual wills. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that,
under Nebraska law, the surviving spouse's interest in property passing
under and outside a joint will was terminable by reason of the contractual
nature of the joint will, and therefore none of such property qualified
for the marital deduction. 7 On the other hand, the same court held
that, under Iowa law, the terminable interest rule did not preclude
the allowance for the marital deduction with regard to property passing
outside the terms of a joint will.2 United States v. Spicer"9 is another
example of the importance of state law in the area of joint and mutual
wills. In this case, the decedent and his wife were residents of Kansas
and held certain property in joint and survivorship form; the decedent
also had other property in his own name. In 1952, they executed a
joint and contractual will. Aside from certain specific bequests, the
will left all the property to the survivor with the right to sell and convey
the property At the death of the survivor the property went to the
children. The Commissioner denied the marital deduction on the ground
that the joint tenancies were severed by the execution of the will and that
the surviving spouse had only a life estate without a general power of
appointment. The district court allowed the marital deduction for all
property that passed to the widow, holding that the joint tenancies had
not been severed. In affirming the district court decisions, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the surviving spouse had absolute
control over the property; therefore, the marital deduction was allowed.
This is not to suggest that joint and mutual wills are not proper tools
for estate planning should spouses desire to dispose of their estates
in that manner; but the hazards of such wills should be taken into con-
sideration, and it is well for the attorney to consider carefully the ap-
plicable state law
25. Nettz v. Phillips, 202 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Iowa 1962); Estate of Charles Elson, 28 T.C.
442 (1957).
26. Estate of Awtry v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955).
27 Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 741 (8th Cir.), reversing 23 T.C. 1020
(1955).
28. Estate of Awtry v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955).
29. 332 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1964).
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TAX CLAUSES
The tax clause, of course, sets out the sources from which federal estate
taxes, inheritance taxes, and other succession taxes should be paid. But
misuse or lack of a tax clause can create a tax planner's Frankenstein. The
regulations state that if death taxes are to be paid from the marital deduc-
tion share, the marital deduction is reduced accordingly, thus reducing
the federal estate tax benefit."0 Problems usually arise where the testator
leaves a share of his residuary estate to his spouse so as to qualify for
the marital deduction, and then either directs that all federal estate taxes
be paid out of the residuary estate, or fails to include any tax clause.
Problems also arise where the surviving spouse elects against the will. In
Estate of Albert L. Rice,3 the decedent, a Massachusetts resident, had
created a revocable trust agreement during his lifetime which created a
maximum marital deduction trust and a nonmarital trust. The decedent's
will "poured over" his probate estate to the trusts. The will contained
no tax clause, but the trustee was given discretion to pay taxes out of
either the marital or nonmarital trusts. The trust estate encompassed
most of the decedent's property, and the trustee chose the nonmantal
trust as the source of all death taxes, claiming the maximum marital de-
duction for the estate. The Commissioner, on the other hand, claimed
that the marital deduction should be reduced by a share of the death
taxes. The Tax Court in sustaining the Commissioner stated that the
Massachusetts apportionment statute contains no provision whereby, in
the absence of a provision of the will or trust, the marital deduction
property is to be relieved from bearing any portion of federal estate taxes,
and the fact that the trustee had actually selected the nonmarital trust as
the source of payment was of no moment because the trustee could have
chosen either as a source of payment.
Tax Apportionment on Ohio
Ohio has no tax apportionment statute; federal taxes are apportioned,
in the absence of contrary direction in the will, on equitable principles
- but this is questionable. The case of Campbell v. Lloyd is the lead-
mg case in Ohio on apportionment of federal estate taxes in the absence
of a tax clause. In Campbell, the widow elected to take against the will
and under the statute of descent and distribution. The question presented
to the court was: If the spouse elects to take under the law, should the
amount of the federal estate tax be deducted from the estate before com-
puting the spouse's share? The Ohio Supreme Court answered in the
30. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(c) (1958).
31. 41 T.C. 344 (1963).
32. 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954).
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affirmative, stating that the federal estate tax should first be deducted
in the same fashion as an administrative expense or other debt, with the
surviving spouse taking after the federal estate tax has been deducted
from the estate. Thus, the surviving spouse bears her share of the taxes,
and the overall tax bill is increased. In Ohio, the principle of appor-
tionment of federal estate taxes has also been carried into the fields of
insurance and other nonprobate assets.8 3 Thus, it would appear that
where the will is silent on the subject of payment of taxes, or the tax
clause in the will is too ambiguous to be effective, or the surviving
spouse elects to take against the will, the burden of federal estate taxes
must fall proportionately on all beneficiaries. However, ominous de-
velopments have taken place in the last few months which cast a shadow
on these principles. The case of Unzon Commerce Bank v Roth34 has
put a question mark after federal estate tax apportionment in Ohio. In
Roth, the decedent executed his will in 1957 creating the typical maxi-
mum marital deduction trust and a nonmarital trust. Item VIII of the
will directed that "all estate, inheritance and succession taxes with
respect to any property, whether passing under this will or otherwise
shall be paid by my executors out of my residuary estate passing under
Item IV of this, my Last Will and Testament. " Item IV of the de-
cedent's will created the nonmarital trust. The widow elected to take
under the law and against the will, and maintained that her intestate
share should not have to bear its proportionate share of federal estate
taxes. The court, without referring to the Campbell case, held that the
widow's election to take under the law and against the will did not
destroy the effect of the tax clause in the will since the tax clause was
not a provision in the decedent's will which gave a "benefit" to the
widow Furthermore, the decedent, by using the tax clause in question,
had contemplated that his spouse might elect to take against the will.
The court stated that when the decedent used the word otherwise in the
tax clause, it was clearly contemplated by the decedent that his spouse
might elect to take against the will. Therefore, the widow's intestate
share was not required to bear its proportionate share of federal estate
taxes. Where does this leave the status of Ohio law regarding the ap-
portionment of death taxes? Should the Roth case be viewed as a de-
cision which is limited to a particular fact situation? It is true that there
was no tax clause in Campbell v. Lloyd, but the inconsistencies in these
cases may cause attorneys to be somewhat hesitant in advising a sur-
viving spouse of the tax consequences to her if she elects to take against
the will. Other jurisdictions have refused to apply the principles of the
33. McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952); Foerster
v. Foerster, 122 N.E.2d 314 (Ohuo P. Ct. 1954)
34. 197 N.E.2d 216 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964)
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Roth case,"s and the federal government may continue, as it has in the
past, to apply the legal principles of Campbell v. Lloyd.3 6
The Roth case will not be appealed, and so a cloak of darkness sur-
rounds apportionment by equitable principles in Ohio. The great les-
son to be learned from the Roth case is that the draftsman can never
adopt an "Alice-in-Wonderland" approach to his trade, because words do
not mean what you want them to mean; the remedy is the absolute
necessity of dearly spelling out in the will or trust where the tax burden
is to fall under all possible circumstances."
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
It is mportant at this point to discuss a few administrative provisions
that could affect the marital deduction. It goes without saying that
broad administrative powers add to the flexibility of an inter vivos or
testamentary trust, but the draftsman must be aware that too broad a
use of a trustee's administrative powers may have unwelcomed federal
estate tax consequences. For example, many trust instruments contain a
clause which authorizes the trustee to retain property whether productive
or nonproductive of income, received from the decedent. The regula-
tions state that where a trust contains such a provision, the retention of
unproductive property will not necessarily disqualify it for the marital
deduction if the applicable rules for administration of the trust require or
permit the surviving spouse to require that the trustee either make the
property productive or convert it within a reasonable time.3
Nonproductive Assets
The careful draftsman will provide either that the trustee must
make nonproductive assets productive, or that the surviving spouse may
35. Merchants Nael Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.), cert.
dented, 355 U.S. 881 (1957); Herson v. Mills, 221 F. Supp. 741 (D.D.C. 1963)
36. Estate of Jaeger v. Commssioner, 252 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1958).
37. As one possible remedy to the Roth type situation, the following tax clause is submitted
for the reader's consideration:
If my said wife does not survive me, I direct that all inheritance, estate, succes-
sion and other taxes of a similar nature levied or assessed by reason of my death,
together with interest or penalties thereon, if any, whether such taxes be levied or
assessed with respect to property passing under this Will or otherwise, be paid by
my Executor from my residuary estate. If my said wife survives me and elects to
take under this Will, such taxes, interest and penalties shall be paid by my Executor
from that fraction of my residuary estate wich, pursuant to the provisions of Para-
graph ---- hereof, does not qualify for the marital deduction; and I direct that my
said Executor shall not be entitled to, nor shall he seek, reimbursement or contribu-
tion therefore from any person whomever or any property whatever. If my said
wife survives me and elects to take against the provisions of this Will and in lieu
thereof under the statute of descent and distribution, such taxes, interest and penal-
ties shall be charged proportionately to all beneficiaries of my estate, whether such
beneficiary's interest passed to him by my Will or otherwise or by said election.
38. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (4) (1958).
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require the trustee to do so. In the case of a large block of non-income
producing assets, such as stock in a closely held corporation, the testator
may desire that such an asset be retained by the trustee. The regulations
provide an answer to such situations by stating that the marital deduction
will not be lost even though the trustee cannot be required to make the
property productive, if the trustee must invade the corpus for the requi-
site beneficial enjoyment of the surviving spouse, such as by payments to
the surviving spouse out of other assets of the trust.3" Another special
situation to consider is the retention of the family residence for the sur-
viving spouse in the marital deduction trust. This is, of course, non-
income producing property, but the regulations provide that the retention
of such property by the trustee will not disqualify the trust for the marital
deduction.4" Where the residence is retained for the benefit of the sur-
viving spouse and children of the decedent, there is a risk that it would
not qualify for the marital deduction even though the surviving spouse
has a legal obligation to support the children.4 The regulations may
provide relief in this situation by implying that a residence which is
furnished for a surviving spouse who has a legal obligation to support a
child is, in fact, an amount paid to her."
Allocatton of Income
Many trusts give the trustee the power to determine what is in-
come or principal and to allocate receipts and disbursements between
income and principal. This presents a problem in that it could reduce
the income to which the surviving spouse is entitled. The regulations
provide that such a power in the trustee, if subject to reasonable limita-
tions, will not disqualify the interest passing in trust for the marital
deduction.43 The question arises, however, as to whether such a power
is subject to reasonable limitations. If state statutes or decisions provide
a degree of control over such discretionary powers of the trustee, a pro-
vision giving the trustee discretion to allocate receipts and disbursements
between principal and income should not endanger the marital deduction.
Spendthrift Trusts
Ever since Sherrow v Brookover,44 decided by the Ohio Supreme
Court in 1963, the validity of a spendthrift provision in Ohio has been an
open question. However, it would appear that the Sherrow case did
39. Reg. § 20.2056(b) -5 (f) (5) (1958)
40. See note 37 supra.
41. Estate of Morton H. Spero, 34 T.C. 1116 (1960)
42. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(j) (1958).
43. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (2) (1958); Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (3) (1958).
44. 174 Ohio St. 310, 189 N.E.2d 90 (1963).
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